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During our first research in Jhakri, an exclusively Muslim village in Bijnor district 
(north-western Uttar Pradesh), the sterilisation drive associated with the Emergency of 
1975-7 was a recent memory. Our field-notes, then and subsequently, have repeatedly 
registered the conviction that using contraceptive techniques, especially sterilisation 
[nasbandī or ‘tube closing’], is contrary to Islam.1 Recent surveys elsewhere in India 
indicate that 9 per cent of currently-married Muslim women—but only 1 per cent of 
Hindu and Christian women—say that their main reason for not intending to use 
contraception is because it is ‘against their religion’. For Bhat and Zavier, these figures 
reflect Muslims’ slavish obedience to ignorant mullahs and account for most of the 
differences in contraceptive use between members of the three communities (Bhat & 
Zavier 2005: 400). Islamic doctrines are widely presumed to be central to Muslims’ 
everyday lives. Superficially, Jhakri residents might seem to endorse this rarely 
examined or substantiated assumption, but leaving matters there would fall far short of 
adequately accounting for their fertility behaviour.
First we outline how several aspects of Muslim reformers’ agendas might seem 
consistent with fertility limitation, yet the historical record provides no clear impression 
of their views on contraception. Further, the idea that Muslims slavishly follow a 
monolithic ‘Islamic doctrine’ ignores the contested and shifting understandings of 
contraception yielded by the same authoritative Islamic sources. With this backdrop, we 
1Endnotes 
 
 This paper draws particularly on our research in Bijnor district on education (including 
madrasahs) with Craig Jeffrey in 2000-2003 funded by Economic and Social Research Council 
(R000238495), Ford Foundation and Royal Geographical Society; and in Jhakri in 2003-2005 
funded by Wellcome Trust (GR067231). Earlier research was funded by Economic and Social 
Research Council in 1982-1983, 1985 (G00230027 and G00232238) and Hayter Fund; in 
1990-1991 by Overseas Development Administration and Rockefeller Foundation. We thank them 
for their support; none bears any responsibility for what we have written here. We also thank the 
people of our study villages and our research assistants, Swaleha Begum, Zarin Rais, the late 
Radha Rani Sharma, Chhaya Sharma, Shaila Rais, and Manjula Sharma. Our thanks also to 
Filippo and Caroline Osella, participants at the Muslim Reform workshop in SOAS in 2005, and 
Sanjam Ahluwalia, Guy Attewell, Rachel Berger, Markus Daechsel, Joyce Flueckiger, Sarah 
Hodges, Laura Jeffery, Justin Jones, Fareeha Khan, Siobhan Lambert-Hurley, Adil Mehdi, 
Barbara Metcalf, Gail Minault, Dietrich Reetz, Barbara Ramusack, Francis Robinson, Yoginder 
Sikand, Mrinalini Sinha, Muhammad Qasim Zaman. For more details on our Bijnor research, see 
Jeffery et al. (1989); Jeffery & Jeffery (1997); Jeffery & Jeffery (1996). 
Disputing Contraception Feb 2007 revisions/3
outline how most women in Jhakri assert that sterilisation is contrary to Islam—yet 
almost in the same breath also complain about poverty and their inability to rear and 
educate numerous children properly. Moreover, whilst teachers at village madrasahs 
and senior clerics at the influential Daru’l `Ulūm seminary at Deoband generally take a 
restrictive view of contraception, Muslim villagers who oppose contraception (especially 
sterilisation) take a harder line still. Nevertheless, we must situate the fertility behaviour 
of rural Muslims in north India in the wider social, political and economic contexts 
within which they are struggling to make their way in the world—the standard 
demographic practice for people of other faith communities. ‘Islamic doctrine’ and 
clerical pronouncements alone provide a poor basis for interpreting Muslims’ fertility 
behaviour in contemporary India.
Muslim reform and contraception
Muslim reformers in South Asia have long debated what Islamic doctrine decrees for its 
adherents and what practices constitute un-Islamic accretions. A succinct account is 
virtually impossible, for the debates were often heated and the conclusions reached were 
diverse (Metcalf 1982; Reetz 2006; Robinson 2001; Sanyal 1996). One recurrent theme, 
however, is individual responsibility for salvation, which can be ensured through the 
performance of good actions in this world. Thus Muslim reformers have exhorted 
ordinary Muslims to learn what is required and to ‘rationalise’ their everyday behaviour 
(Daechsel 2004; Metcalf 1984, 1993, 1994b, 1996, 2004; Zaman 1999). For reformers, 
education was key to eradicating the ‘backwardness’ to which many élite Muslims 
considered their brethren were prone (Seth 2006). And, whether with respect to bodily 
discipline, manners, clothing and speech, moral purification and domestic cleanliness, or 
living according to a strict daily schedule, women as homemakers, wives and mothers are 
central in Muslim reform agendas (Daechsel 2006; Jeffery et al. 2004, 2005, 2006; 
Metcalf 1990, 1994a, 1999; Minault 1998; Winkelmann 2005a, 2005b). Tablighī writers 
are not alone in seeing this ‘inner struggle to discipline and moral purification’ as the 
greater jihād (Metcalf 2004: 274).2 These efforts, moreover, strikingly parallel the class 
projects of non-Muslim reformers attempting to ‘gentrify’ poor illiterates by purging 
their ignorant habits; the view that education was a the means of achieving this; and 
educated women’s responsibility to create domestic orderliness and rear children for 
2 Tablighī Jama`at is a Deoband-inspired proselytising movement to apprise Muslims of their 
core religious duties. See Metcalf (1993; 1996; 1999); Sikand (2002). 
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whom bodily discipline and ‘civility’ was second-nature (Gooptu 2001; Gupta 1998, 
2002; Joshi 2001; Walsh 2004).
At the very least, contraception might seem to have an elective affinity for the reform 
agenda and ‘rationalised’ everyday life, especially as Muslim reformists’ disciplining 
regimes did not include sexual abstinence within marriage. Szreter et al. characterise a 
demographic orthodoxy in which ‘the planning of families is somehow umbilically tied to 
the modernization of society’ (Szreter et al. 2003: 145) and widespread contraceptive 
usage occurs only when people’s lives approximate to ‘modernity’. Before that, people 
tend to say that conception is ‘up to God’ or a matter of ‘fate’, something that is not (and 
should not be) subject to human intervention. With ‘modernity’, people’s views and 
behaviour shift from fatalism to imagining the possibility of family planning. And what 
demographers generally see as quintessential trademarks of ‘modernity’—disciplined 
bodies, regulated domestic life and so forth—find their echoes in Muslim reform. Would 
not the good Muslim life would be more attainable if women’s devotion to domestic and 
religious duties, attention to their children’s educational progress, and investment in 
their children’s education and wellbeing are not undermined by repeated childbearing? 
Rather surprisingly, however, Muslim reformers do not seem to have recommended 
fertility limitation or birth spacing. Historians of Muslim reform in the late colonial 
period rarely even mention contraception, whilst historians working on contraceptive 
debates have generally not examined documents written by Muslim reformists. Yet, we 
would contend, viewing Muslim reform in South Asia through the lens of contraception 
would give new leverage over our puzzles in this paper.
The Qur’ān Sharīf contains no more than implicit discussion of contraception and hadīs 
do not provide a consistent view. In the pre-modern period, judgements were reached 
through ijtihād [interpretive thinking] by religious experts, based on ijmā [consensus] 
and qiyās [analogical reasoning]. Human fallibility in interpreting God’s will provided 
scope for legitimate disagreement and for reaching different conclusions in good faith. 
Over time, schools of jurisprudence and individual Muslim scholars reached differing 
conclusions about contraception (Omran 1992; Sachedina 1990). Yet the main schools of 
jurisprudence all considered contraception permissible, if sometimes blameworthy and 
disapproved [makrūh]. A person’s motives [nīyat] are crucial for gauging the 
permissibility of their actions (Katz 2003: 43, 45): conflicting yet apparently inviolable 
principles required compromises and ‘necessity’ could be the trump card (Bowen 2003: 
57). 
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Musallam’s survey of legal, medical and erotic literatures in Muslim west Asia up to the 
nineteenth century lists suppositories, ointments, coitus interruptus or ‘azl, but not 
surgical contraceptive techniques (Musallam 1983). As Musallam comments, this 
presumes neither efficacy nor widespread use of contraceptive techniques.3 Nevertheless, 
Muslim reformers in nineteenth and twentieth century South Asia had access to an array 
of textual materials discussing contraception, some of which featured in yūnān-ī tibb 
curricula in South Asia (Guy Attewell, personal communication 7 June 2006; 
Zillurrahman 1994). But were they taught in full (and why, then, is the secondary 
literature so silent about them)? Or had they been abridged to exclude references to 
contraception (and if so why)? Or had they been bypassed by reformers intent on 
returning to (supposedly) authenticated texts dating from an earlier period than the 
material Musallam cites? 
Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (1864-1943), for instance, is renowned within the reform 
literature because of his advice manual Bihishtī Zewar (Metcalf 1990). He did not 
discuss contraception there, but in a collection of fatwa he said that the use of 
contraception is permissible only if there is a ‘legitimate excuse’ [‘uzr sahih], as when a 
woman is weakened by repeated childbearing.4 Although the ‘legitimate excuse’ gives 
some interpretive flexibility, contraception is generally not permissible—in other words, 
hardly an enthusiastic endorsement. 
On the other hand, as Islam moved towards increasingly narrow views of the shari`a as 
invariant and exact, new artefacts and ideas considered of western origin could be 
deemed unacceptable, because they were not legitimised by the shari`a and other 
authoritative texts (Zaman 2002).5 Hostility to contraception might reflect that change 
(Muhammad Qasim Zaman, personal communication, 22 May 2006). Certainly, Muslim 
3 Musallam also notes that attributing agency to people in pre-modern Islamic societies 
challenges the modernist demographic orthodoxy that presumes pre-modern fatalism. 
4 We thank Fareeha Khan for this reference (Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s fatwa collection, 
Imdad al-fatawa (Dar ul-Uloom Karachi 6-volume edition, Volume 4, pp. 202-205) (personal 
communication, 24 May 2006). 
5 Messick discusses a similar shift in Yemen towards more rigid and codified versions of the 
shari`a under the modernising pressures of colonising powers (Messick 1993: 34).  By contrast, 
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and colleagues involved in the Aligarh movement were generally positively 
inclined towards western science and technology, although the secondary literature does not 
discuss contraception: Ahmad (1967: 31-56); Lelyveld (1978). 
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clerics, among many others, often perceived aspects of contemporary western gender 
politics—such as women’s entry into paid employment—as profoundly immoral. For 
Syed Abul A‘lā Maudūdī (1903-1979), contraception and freely available abortion were a 
western plot to spawn sexual promiscuity and social disorder in which women’s focus on 
domestic duties would be undermined (Maudūdī 1968 [1937]; Maudūdī 1972 [1939]); 
both originally published in Urdu).6 
The arithmetic of communal politics and Muslim anxiety about minority status could 
also mesh with hostility to contraception (Justin Jones, personal communication, 27 
May 2006). By the 1920s, a ‘common wisdom’ about Muslim fertility was already in play 
(Jeffery & Jeffery 2006). Proto-Hindutva writers insistently made shrill claims that 
Hindus would soon be outnumbered by Muslims (see Cohn 1987; Datta 1999; Gupta 
2002). It would be puzzling if Muslim reformers made no equally vociferous replies: in 
other debates, Muslim élites intervened on the representation of different religious 
communities in public bodies, trying to preserve or restore their earlier over-
representation; Muslim theologians also resisted shuddhī campaigns [‘purification’, or 
‘re-conversions’ to Hinduism] (Dietrich Reetz, personal communication, 11 May 2006; 
cf. Reetz, 2006: 148-151).7
The ‘rationalising’ tendencies of Muslim reform—domestic order and cleanliness—might 
have pointed towards contraception. Horror at western immorality or the communal 
numbers game, though, might have pushed in another direction. Quite probably, Muslim 
élites in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries adopted diverse positions on the 
subject (Sanjam Ahluwalia, personal communication 20 May 2006).8 The relative silence 
6 Although not a trained ‘ulama, Maudūdī was central in Jama`at-e Islami and his writings have 
had widespread influence: Ahmad (1967: 208-223); Bowen (2003); Karim (2005: 50ff.); 
Mahmood (1977: 107-127); Nasr (1994). 
7 Western licentiousness and concerns about ‘numbers’ also figure on the global stage: at the 1994 
UN International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, some Muslim delegates 
(and others from the global south), saw abortion, in particular, as a threat to morality and a 
means by which western governments and development agencies were trying to limit Muslim 
populations: Bowen (1997); Katz (2003); McIntosh & Finkle (1995); Petchesky (1995). 
8 Contraceptive debates touched on many other issues: eugenics and ‘racial’ decline, age of 
consent, child marriage, gender politics, reproductive health, and the furore generated by the 
publication of Mother India; see Hodges (2006); Mayo (1998); Ramusack (2006); Sinha (1998); 
Whitehead (1996). 
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of the historical record is intriguing, though, given how politically contentious 
contraception is in India today.  In the contemporary period, few Muslim clerics have 
advocated family planning and Khan suggests that sterilisation is not actively endorsed 
by any school of Islamic jurisprudence (Khan 1979: 184-191). Yet there are diverse views 
about when contraception may be permissible. 
For instance, the late Qadi Mujahid al-Islam Qasimi (once chief qāzī of the Muslim 
Personal Law Body in Bihar and Orissa and executive member of the All-India Muslim 
Personal Law Board) asserted that contraception is not normally permissible. It should 
be adopted only under very stringent conditions, including the mother’s health and 
spacing children so that they could be reared properly, but excluding women’s 
professional or social concerns and fear of being unable to feed one’s children. 
Sterilisation is almost always forbidden, because it ‘destroys the power of reproduction’ 
and ‘renders a woman incapable of conceiving’ (Qasimi 2003-2004). On the same 
website, Shaykh Faraz Rabbani, a Deobandi sympathiser of South Asian descent who 
works in Amman, argues that having children is important in Islam, but also that 
modern kinds of contraception are akin to ‘azl [coitus interruptus]. They may be used if 
there are ‘sound reasons’—including wanting a manageable family size, lacking support 
of extended families in childrearing,  wanting to give children the attention, education, 
and support they need in difficult times, genuine health reasons etc., all providing that 
the spouses agree: a broader set of conditions that those specified by Qasimi (Rabbani 
2005). Like Qasimi, Rabbani excludes sterilisation, but ‘because of the general 
impermissibility of “changing” the human body’, noting that this opinion derives from 
the same texts that render cosmetic surgery generally impermissible.9 
Tahir Mahmood’s starkly contrasting argument is an extended critique of Maudūdī and 
clerics adopting a similar stance (Mahmood 1977).10 A verse in Sura 17 in the Qur’ān 
Sharīf [Bānī Isrāīl or Children of Israel] commands Muslims not to slay their children 
out of fear of want: infanticide is a great sin and Allah will provide for all. Some readings 
9 We thank Fareeha Khan for these references. When she asked Rabbani to clarify his position he 
replied: “The opinion I gave is more liberal than the Deobandi position (classical and 
contemporary), but is more representative of (a) Arab Hanafi scholarship; (b) what the texts seem 
to state; (c) what I feel is closer to the needs and circumstances of people.” (Fareeha Khan, 
personal communication, 25 May 2006). 
10 Mahmood is an academic lawyer and one-time Chairman of India’s National Commission for 
Minorities. 
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equate contraception with killing the unborn children whom Allah has written into one’s 
fate. Mahmood contends that Muslims should interpret the Qur’ān Sharīf in light of 
contemporary concerns: this verse, he insists, forbids murder (not contraception) and 
‘azl should include all pre-conception contraceptive techniques.11 People’s livelihoods are 
divine gifts that require effort, not idle submission to nature. Contrary to Maudūdī, 
contraception is not a western imposition and it is better to rear small numbers of ‘good 
Muslims’ than numerous ill-kempt children. Mahmood also discusses several prominent 
Indian Muslims—clerics, lawyers, politicians—who advocated family planning and saw 
no contradictions with Islamic precepts, including Maulana Azad and Dr Zakir Husain 
(Mahmood 1977: 70ff.). Similarly, Asghar Ali Engineer considers that Muslims should 
subject contraception to the same searching interrogation or ijtihād (interpretative 
thinking) that enables them to respond to any social change. He defines ‘azl as 
contraception in general, rather than coitus interruptus, and concludes that 
contraception is usually permissible (Engineer 2005: 98-110). Advocating contraception, 
however, is extremely controversial, as witness the spat between leading figures in the 
All-India Muslim Personal Law Board. In late 2004, Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, vice-
president of the AIMPLB made a statement in favour of family planning: he was roundly 
contradicted by Sayyid Muhammad Rabe Hasani Nadvi, the AIMPLB President, and 
contributors to the subsequent debate in the Urdu newspaper Rashtriya Sahara (Sikand 
2005a). Sadiq re-entered the fray by insisting that Islam requires Muslims to be 
‘rational’ and that family planning is not contrary to Islamic principles (Times of India, 4 
December 2005). 
In other words, the same theological sources can lead to diametrically opposed 
conclusions about the permissibility of contraception in Islam. But how do these matters 
play out on the ground? 
The Bijnor context
Bijnor district in north-western Uttar Pradesh rates relatively highly on most economic 
indicators, but its social indicators—such as literacy—are more modest: it ranked 57th of 
the 63 districts in UP (Singh 2001: Table VIII.3), with a literacy rate of 47 per cent for 
females over 7 and of 70 per cent for males (Registrar General & Census Commissioner 
11 Likewise, Dawood considers that this injunction refers only to the pre-Islamic practice of female 
infanticide (Dawood 1968: 231). 
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of India: 2002). Literacy levels in rural areas and amongst the poor are generally lower 
than the aggregate figures. 
At nearly 42 per cent of the total, the district’s Muslim population is unusually sizeable 
(comprising about a third of the district’s rural population and over two thirds of its 
urban population) (Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India 2004). Some 
villages have exclusively Hindu or Muslim populations, others are mixed. Jhakri, for 
instance, has an all-Muslim population (of 663 in 2002). Muslims are underrepresented 
in formal schooling in Bijnor district (Jeffery et al.: 2005, Jeffery & Jeffery: 2006 and 
Jeffery et al.: 2007), and, as elsewhere in UP, Muslims in Bijnor district have lower 
literacy rates than the aggregate figures and they are disproportionately concentrated 
towards the bottom of the urban and rural economic hierarchies (Ali & Sikand 2006; 
Khalidi 2006; Sachar 2006; Shariff 1995). Moreover, Muslims are not as politically 
influential in Bijnor district as their numbers might suggest (Jeffery & Jeffery 2006: 
13ff.).
The overwhelming majority of Muslims in the district are Sunni. Moreover, the Daru’l  
`Ulūm seminary in Deoband, in neighbouring Saharanpur district, exercises a decisive 
influence: the current vice-chancellor is from a prominent family in Bijnor town and 
there are many links between Bijnor and the seminary. There is a negligible presence of 
Barelwis. Local madrasahs have direct links to Deoband: inspections by Deoband staff, 
despatching some senior pupils there to study, or recruiting teaching staff [maulwīs] 
from Deoband itself or from other madrasahs within its ambit. For instance, the imām 
in Jhakri runs a small madrasah: he studied at the Mazāhir-i `Ulūm in Saharanpur, an 
offshoot of Daru’l `Ulūm. Many maulwīs originate from Bijnor district itself, some from 
relatively poor urban backgrounds, others from rural households (usually ones owning 
small amounts of land). A few are from impoverished families in places such as eastern 
UP and Bihar and have studied in boarding madrasahs since childhood. Like the Muslim 
villagers we talked to, the maulwīs are convinced that Muslim ambitions in the wider 
world are routinely thwarted. Most could not have afforded to obtain high educational 
qualifications in the Hindi-medium schooling system: the madrasah sector had provided 
a cheap or even free route to respectable—though rarely lucrative—employment that they 
believe would otherwise have eluded them.12
12 For a more general account of madrasahs in contemporary India, see Sikand (2005b). 
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The numbers of rural girls and boys attending local madrasahs have risen substantially 
since the early 1990s, although most have ceased attending by the age of 12 or so.  In 
Begawala, about a kilometre from Jhakri, pupil numbers exceed 1000, and several 
smaller madrasahs serve other nearby villages. Maulwīs play a conspicuous role in the 
‘civilising mission’ with respect to their pupils—bodily cleanliness, refined speech and 
punctuality, so familiar from accounts of reform movements in north India (cf. Jeffery et 
al. 2004, 2005, 2006). Madrasah curricula do not explicitly address family planning. 
Some maulwīs, however, are also imāms in village mosques, and are often asked to 
answer moral problems. Further, the Tablighī Jama`at was hardly a presence in rural 
Bijnor until the early 1990s: nowadays, though, tablighī parties make periodic tours to 
villages—including Jhakri—and adult Muslim villagers have increasingly been exposed to 
their instruction.
Nevertheless, despite the increased reach of such educational activities, few adults in 
Jhakri can read Urdu or Hindi with facility, let alone Arabic. And, aside from creating 
problems for accessing employment, low literacy compromises the reform agenda, which 
rests so heavily on individual self-improvement. So what is the relationship between 
Islamic teachings and fertility behaviour? How do Jhakri residents’ views on 
contraception relate to all this clerical outreach?  
A recent commentary on the demographic transition notes that contraceptive behaviour 
at the grassroots has often been conspicuously adrift from élite debates (Szreter et al. 
2003). Further, Obermeyer argues that ‘we do not clearly understand … how changes in 
ideology affect the choices women make—or do not make—and how alternatives are 
translated into the behaviours of individual women’ (Obermeyer 1994: 71). The case of 
Taranam and Talib provides a vista from which to begin exploring these questions.13 
Talib and Taranam
Talib’s 0.16 hectares of land provide little income, and the household basically relies 
upon his wood trading business. He earns around Rs6000-7000 each month, a good 
sum for an uneducated village man. In the first nine years of their marriage, Taranam 
had had eight conceptions, including three miscarriages. In 1998, her eighth pregnancy 
resulted in obstructed labour: she was taken to hospital, where Talib instructed the 
13 We use pseudonyms throughout this paper; people who figure in our earlier publications have 
their original pseudonyms. All quotations have been translated by the authors. 
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doctor to sterilise her—and the girl born by caesarean section survived only a few hours. 
The medical costs had amounted to Rs16,000. 
When we first asked Taranam about the nasbandī [sterilisation], her response seemed 
surprisingly casual: ‘If it is forbidden, what then? My health was bad and the doctor was 
saying there was no chance that I’d survive another delivery. My health in general was 
bad and when I became pregnant I had a cough and fever. And I’d also had several 
miscarriages.’ Yet when we met them both later, a much more complex picture emerged. 
Shaila and Patricia were talking to Taranam and to Talib’s married niece [eBD] about 
family planning when Talib came in and sat down beside Taranam.14 He immediately 
joined in the conversation. According to Talib, most villagers are boorish [gawār] and 
illiterate people [jāhil log], who believe that having more children will generate more 
income: 
Talib: But that’s not true. Earnings are getting less and the eaters are becoming more. 
You’ve heard about my niece’s children. One is ‘making beards’ [barbering], 
another is riding a rickshaw and another is ‘digging grass’ [doing nothing useful]. 
If there were fewer children, they wouldn’t be doing this useless work. … How will 
a mazdūr [labourer] feed 10-12 children? People here don’t think that chhotā 
parivār sukhā parivār hogā [‘a small family will be a contented family’, the 
Indian family planning slogan]. 
Patricia: But people in the village say that children are Allah’s gift [Allah kī den] and that 
they shouldn’t stop them coming. 
Talib burst out laughing: Children aren’t Allah’s gift! People are saying incorrect things! 
They [children] are a man’s gift [ādmī kī den] and if a person wishes, then he 
won’t make any children.15 However many children he wishes, those he can make. 
If there are few children, then you can do everything. But villagers don’t think of 
14 This discussion was in February 2003. Shaila took detailed notes at the time, wrote up in Hindi, 
and Patricia translated them into English. This abridged account excludes our discussion of the 
importance of having children (especially sons), a significant influence on family planning 
decisions that often arose in discussions in Jhakri, along with the financial troubles generated by 
emergency medical care.  
15 Although ādmī also means a ‘person’ unmarked by gender, we have translated it as ‘man’ since 
this accords with Talib’s meaning here. 
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this comfort. Bas, they close their eyes and keep on making children and don’t do 
anything else! 
Being sterilised is a great sin, Talib continued, because it is not permitted according to 
hadis: when a sterilised woman dies, he asserted, her funeral prayers cannot be said and 
she will not be blessed when she goes ‘above’. We asked what would happen to Taranam, 
since Talib had agreed to her sterilisation whilst she was under an anaesthetic. Taranam 
said she would not have agreed if she had been conscious and Talib butted in to say that 
Taranam had done nothing wrong and the sin would all rest on him. Nevertheless, he 
insisted, it was the correct decision for them. They had few children and were living 
peacefully: ‘I’m thankful to Allah that we’re living very well, the children and the two of 
us. Whatever the children need, I bring immediately. If the children have asked for Rs50 
shoes, then I’ll bring them and they’ll last for 6 months and then I bring some more. And 
if I had 10-12 children, I’d be bringing shoes for Rs2-4 that break the very moment they 
arrive at the house! So having few children gives this benefit.’ In any case, the doctor told 
him that any future children would have to be delivered by ‘operation’ [caesarean 
section]: ‘I thought that her [Taranam’s] health would be damaged and where would I 
get so much money from? I thought, “today I have Rs16,000, but tomorrow if I don’t, 
then she’ll die.” That’s why I agreed to the [nasbandī] operation.’ Certainly, he admitted, 
other people in the village had criticised him for the decision, but his riposte was robust: 
Why should I listen to what anyone says? I have to bring the children up and if 
she [Taranam] were to die like Razia did, what would happen to my house? … 
Women don’t understand that this [childbirth] is women’s death. Just look at 
Razia. She herself died in giving birth. And behind her, her children are worried 
and her husband is also worried. She’d had 11-12 children and there was no life in 
her body. She’d become weak. There’s a great advantage in having few children. 
Razia from my village died because of poverty. There were only the women of the 
house beside her and they had called a dāī [traditional birth attendant]. But if 
they had taken Razia to town sooner, then she, bichārī [poor thing], wouldn’t 
have died.  
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Taranam, however, was not convinced by Talib’s argument: people who are sterilised 
have made a calculation that is ‘correct for this world but not correct for that world. In 
that world, we shall have to answer questions about why we closed off having children. … 
Razia saw nothing of this world, but she’ll be very happy in that world. She’ll be in 
paradise [jannat].’ 
Shaila was startled: Razia will be in jannat, but where will her children be?
Taranam: You and we are just sinners thinking that. This world is only for a short time, 
so what is there to think about it? 
Patricia: But don’t people have to think about it a bit? 
Talib: That’s right. You have to think about this world. You should also think about what 
will happen to your children after you’re gone. Allah Miyān has also sent us to 
this world to live a good life here. So, bhai, we also think about this world. 
Taranam: I think about that world and you are all thinking about this world. 
Shaila: Which thinking is more correct? 
Taranam: Look, ji, you should think about both worlds. But after you die, what will 
happen? You should think of that first of all. Like you’re writing: if there’s some 
mistake in what you’re writing, then you ask again. You correct your error. Our 
calculation is in the same manner, that Allah is writing everything up above and if 
we’ve done anything wrong, then he’ll ask why we’ve done this wrong thing. So 
that’s why we think about that world more. When a child does something wrong, 
then its mother will punish it. Allah’s calculation is like that too. If we do 
anything wrong, Allah will certainly punish us. 
Talib: But Allah also looks at necessity [majbūrī]. If someone’s throat is being cut and if 
their life can be saved by our telling one lie, then Allah will forgive that lie. And if 
we’ve just lied for no reason, that won’t be forgiven. 
Taranam: Everything is calculated in Allah’s house and sinful people will go to hell 
[dozāq] and women like Razia will go to paradise [jannat]. That poor thing 
finished off her life, and she’s become ‘beloved of Allah’ [because he summoned 
her].
Talib: She has become ‘beloved of Allah’ but she’s left her children behind crying. 
Ambiguities of village voices
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Talib and Taranam’s concerns parallel ones that have echoed through our conversations 
about childbearing over two decades in Jhakri and rural Bijnor more generally: the 
impossibility of rearing numerous children properly, and the damage to women’s health 
of repeated childbearing, fears about maternal mortality, the costs of medical 
interventions in childbearing—all jostling with anxieties about what counts as ‘necessity’ 
and how behaviour in this world affects a person’s destiny in the afterlife. 
Razia’s death in childbirth in 2002 provided a focal point to which women’s thoughts 
repeatedly returned. One day in 2003, Mehmuna, with 7 living children from 10 
pregnancies, told us:
My spirit is filled up [‘fed up’] with children. I have lots of distress [giving birth] 
and now I’m also becoming afraid in case some other ailment comes up. Recently, 
Razia died. Just half of her child’s arm had appeared outside. She had a great deal 
of trouble and the poor thing died. That’s why I’m very fearful. … Thinking about 
Razia, I become very sad, because the poor thing never saw any of the 
celebrations for her children [their marriages, the birth of their children]. In 
giving birth to that child, she must be ‘beloved of Allah’, poor thing. 
Her neighbour Nargis chipped in scornfully: ‘Women here don’t think about whether 
they’ll live or die. They just need children, no matter what happens. Razia died and even 
so the women haven’t learnt a lesson [sabaq].’ One young woman complained 
disgustedly about the short gaps between her children [‘sab tale-ūpar ke hain’: they were 
all born pell-mell). Another mentioned her sister, who was pregnant again, yet her oldest 
daughter was already due to be married: 
Her husband is like a maulānā.16 That’s why there’s a paltan [platoon] of children 
in the house! I don’t like having many children. It’s not within my capacity to 
bring up many children. 
16 Maulānā literally means a judge, but is widely used in a derogative or derisory fashion to denote 
someone who is excessively pious and strict.
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Yet another expressed her views like this: 
Everyone in the village has 8-10 children. They have to do all the work for them. 
With ten children, if you wash the face of one, another remains dirty. If you wash 
the second one’s face, the third one remains dirty. With so many children, there is 
a lot of food to be cooked, there are lots of clothes to be washed and the house 
will also be dirty all the time. … There’s no benefit at all from 10-12 children. 
And, during her 12th pregnancy, another woman delivered this spirited commentary: 
Here they get people married at 14-15 years and then you have ‘vile hardship’ 
[āfat gandī ho jā]. There are 10-10, 12-12 children. You can neither look after 
yourself nor the children. You can’t flourish. Just as you’ve cared for one, another 
is born. The ‘vile hardship’ continues. How can a person flourish? 
Several women begged Allah to prevent further pregnancies [band karā-de] or talked 
about intending to make some ‘arrangements’ or said they had ‘caught hold of their ears’ 
[vowed not to have another child]. Yet women’s comments about excessive childbearing 
and childrearing have not translated into high levels of contraceptive use, which rose 
from around 1 per cent in the 1980s to around 6 per cent in the late 1990s.17 Jhakri 
women rarely adopt ‘modern’ contraceptive methods and sterilisation, in particular, 
remains very uncommon—aside from Taranam, just two Jhakri women were sterilised 
during the 1990s.18 
One was Najma, who had nine pregnancies but only four surviving children. By 1990, her 
supportive mother-in-law had died, an eye injury had badly affected her eyesight and she 
was in poor general health. She had nasbandī ‘just because I was angry’. Nevertheless, 
she had to endure the scorn of neighbours and relatives (Jeffery & Jeffery 1996: 53-68). 
In 2003, Najma claimed that some women nowadays are being sterilised ‘chup ke se’ 
[secretly]. Shaila asked if this was not pointless, since Allah knows everything. Najma’s 
sister’s daughter Mehmuna agreed, saying that women seemed more afraid of people 
than of Allah. And she confirmed that her mother had indeed been angry with Najma, 
because ‘nasbandī is considered bad’, ‘there will not be any forgiveness [bakhshish] and 
their funeral prayers will not be recited.’ Najma retorted ‘what would I have done with so 
many children? If there had been more children, there would have been nothing to eat 
and nothing to wear!’ Mehmuna agreed: 
17 This is significantly lower than for comparable Hindus in neighbouring Dharmnagri. 
18 A few women reported attempting abortions (generally by oral medication), not always 
successfully. 
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There’s no benefit in having many children. Nowadays it’s said that “a small 
family is a contented family and a large family is troubled”. … If there’s a small 
family, there will be less dukh-taklīf [misery-distress]. … With a small family, 
there’s money in the hand and good food and drink.  In a small family, there is 
complete peace.
Despite endorsing small families, however, Mehmuna then provided an elaborate 
account of the sinfulness of being sterilised: 
One time some village woman went on hajj. … Afterwards, a voice comes from 
above to say if the hajj has been accepted or not. This time, the voice said that the 
hajj hadn’t been accepted. … The hajj of all the people there wasn’t accepted. So 
then they all started saying that their pilgrimage hadn’t been accepted because of 
someone amongst them and everyone was searched. Then one woman was found 
who had done nasbandī and everyone said that their hajj hadn’t taken place 
because of this woman. So someone told that woman to go and lick a large stone 
there with her tongue. That woman went and licked the stone and three grubs 
emerged from her tongue. And everyone said that these grubs are the souls of 
three children. If she hadn’t had the operation done, she’d have had three more 
children. So this woman had killed three children and that was why the hajj 
didn’t take place.
A few women said all contraception is against Islam. More often, though, Jhakri women 
said only sterilisation is forbidden and that other methods—pills, injections, IUCDs—are 
permitted. Jamila, for instance, had used ‘Mala-D’ oral contraceptives and currently has 
a Copper-T [IUCD].19 She had 8 living children. In large families, she argued, the plight 
of the youngest children is bleak, especially once the parents have died, because no one 
(including their older siblings) would look after them properly: 
19 For more on Jamila, see Jeffery & Jeffery (1996: 201-215). Many women in rural Bijnor believe 
that Mala-D causes garmī [‘heat’, in the humoral sense] in a woman’s head, and that the Copper-
T is liable to rise up into a woman’s abdomen or chest.  
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But we’re Muslims and that’s why we couldn’t do nasbandī. … You’ll know that 
when someone has nasbandī, the funeral prayers can’t be said. Hindus have one 
or two children and then have nasbandī. They educate those two children 
properly, and feed them well. But with us, this thing is completely forbidden and 
that’s why there are many children. … But just see, we have no matlab [interest] 
in this world. We shouldn’t be thinking about it. … We are just like a guest in 
someone’s house: no matter how long guests stay in your house, one day they’ll 
have to go to their own homes. … Life here is only for a few days. At the very most 
it will be 100 years. … Then we have to show our faces to Allah. In the next life, 
this life will seem like a dream. The life there will be for eternity.
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Just a handful of women thought otherwise. The third woman sterilised during the 1990s 
was embarrassed to be pregnant when her oldest children were already young adults. 
After a failed abortion attempt, she had nasbandī. ‘People say that their funeral prayers 
won’t be accepted,’ she said, ‘but really it isn’t forbidden. There’s no prohibition. If you 
want to do it, you can. We thought, “Allah will do just what he was going to do—but what 
would I do being so embarrassed?” ’ And when we commented to one young woman that 
many people consider that sterilisation is against Islam, she promptly retorted: ‘And if 
you’ve produced 10-12 children and you haven’t made even one of them dīn-dār 
[religious], then what’s the benefit of 10-12 children? That’s why, if there are 2-3 children 
you can look after them properly.’
Like Talib, then, many Jhakri women voiced opposition to large families. But Talib’s 
‘this-worldly’ calculations about providing adequate food, clothes and education for his 
children led to his unusual decision to permit Taranam’s nasbandī. And he was scornful 
about jāhil [ignorant] people unwilling to do likewise. But Taranam’s worries about ‘that 
world’ find their echoes in other women’s views of sterilisation. 
Authoritative voices of local Islam
During conversations with Muslim clerics in Bijnor town, its rural hinterland and in 
Daru’l `Ulūm in Deoband, we explained that village women often lament the strain that 
childbearing puts on household budgets and their own health,  yet feared the 
consequences of using contraception. We asked if contraception is always sinful or 
sometimes permissible, what happened to people in the afterlife if they adopted 
contraception, and whether Allah accepts the funeral prayers of the sterilised. 
All the clerics said that Muslims should not normally limit their fertility. Several referred 
us to Sura 17 in the Qur’ān Sharīf (see above). The manager of the Begawala madrasah 
explained it this way: 
It’s like murder! Look, it’s completely forbidden, because the person who gives us 
our daily bread [rizq] is Allah. It isn’t true that those who have many children are 
poor and those who have one or two children are rich, they are also very poor. I 
could show you so many examples in the neighbouring villages of people with 1-2 
children who are poor. So whatever daily income Allāh-ta`ālā has written, that 
much will be received. If we kill our children because of fear of daily bread, this 
will be very wrong, because Allah is the giver of daily bread.
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People can beg forgiveness for a wrong of their own doing, he said, but destroying 
something that God has made is unforgivable: ‘God gives breath to humanity and later 
he takes it back to himself. So now you understand this: humanity hasn’t made humanity 
and therefore humanity hasn’t been given the right to kill it.’ 
Likewise, the senior Muftī at Deoband asserted: 
It is written in Islam that however many children you have is a matter of good 
fortune [khush nasībī]. However many descendants are born will be correct 
[savāb], because the master of our daily bread is Allah, who made both you and 
me. … He alone feeds us here and you as well.  He nourishes the whole world. So 
what’s the need to worry? Don’t destroy your offspring for fear of daily bread. … 
If you don’t sow seeds, how will there be a crop? … And if there are no children, 
how will the world flourish? People are the world’s lustre.
Several clerics also linked contraception with unwelcome social changes. In terms 
reminiscent of Maudūdī, the Qāzī in Bijnor town lamented that people are freer now 
than previously and dissoluteness [āvāragī] has spread: 
Ever since people took these precautions, society has taken the wrong path. From 
that, religious faith has also gone wrong. And from the society’s point of view, 
people do wrong because they know nothing will happen since they have taken 
precautions.
Similarly, the Deoband Muftī denounced contemporary society: the illegitimate children 
born because of people’s wrong-thinking [ghalat soch], who will have the same faults as 
their parents, today’s men who just need pleasure [lazzat] and bodily enjoyment 
[jismānī maza] and indulge in relationships for which Islam has no place: ‘Behaving like 
that is a very serious sin [sakht gunāh]. … Marriages have been laid down in the Shariat 
so that … you will not think about some other man or woman.’
Several clerics, however, added a rider to their comments: family planning would not be 
sinful in situations of majbūrī [compulsion, helplessness, constraint, powerlessness]. In 
real life, favouring one Islamic principle may necessarily infringe another equally 
significant one. If people are majbūr, contraception can be permitted—when there are 
mitigating circumstances, Thanawi’s ‘legitimate excuse’ or Rabbani’s ‘sound reasons’. 
And precisely how majbūrī is delimited leaves some space for interpretative and 
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behavioural flexibility. The Deoband Muftī, for instance, gave several guidelines for 
judging when contraception (including sterilisation) is permissible: 
Our Gracious Prophet says that children are God’s exceptionally valuable [besh-
qīmatī] gifts. But for the sake of a woman’s health or for some other majbūrī it is 
better that a further child not be born. … Many people come, saying that a doctor 
has told them that there is a danger to life and so they should have the operation. 
… I ask them to bring the written opinion of the doctor, and when I see that I give 
permission.
In his view, however, straitened circumstances and food shortage, whether actual or 
feared, could not justify contraceptive use. Yet, apparently contradicting this, he said 
contraception would be permissible if the government orders people to limit their 
fertility, and if a man would lose his employment unless he or his wife is sterilised: 
‘Because if he loses his job, what will he eat, how will he look after his wife and children?’ 
If the government tries to enforce the slogan ‘ham do, hamāre do’ [we two, our two], 
Muslims should mobilise and try to delay it as much as possible. ‘But, if ham do, hamāre 
do became compulsory [majbūr],’ the Muftī continued, ‘Muslims would have to obey the 
government. They can be sterilised if there is majbūrī, when there is no other remedy 
[chāra]. … Please understand that in our Islam if something is understood as majbūr, if 
there is majbūrī, then things that are not permitted can become permitted.’ How, then, 
did the clerics interpret villagers’ beliefs that funeral prayers cannot be recited for people 
who have been sterilised? A maulwī at the Begawala madrasah commented: 
Look, if there is majbūrī and no option except the operation, then in those 
circumstances the operation is allowed. And the funeral prayers can certainly be 
recited, because people commit very big sins and even so their funeral prayers are 
said. … Whether the funeral prayers are acceptable or not, that has not been 
written. In the Qur’ān Sharīf it has been written that if there is some necessity 
those things that are not permitted become permitted—like the operation is not 
permitted. But if there is some necessity, then that forbidden thing becomes 
permitted. 
Similarly, the Deoband Mufti emphasised repentance and forgiveness whilst 
contradicting the villagers’ beliefs: 
It isn’t written anywhere in the Qur’ān Sharīf that any man or woman cannot 
have their funeral prayers recited if they have had nasbandī. If someone has had 
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nasbandī and they beg forgiveness it will certainly be accepted. Bas, the Shariat 
states that before you die, you should repent your sins [tauba karnā]. … But 
ignorance spreads in the world. People who are ignorant say things about funeral 
prayers being unacceptable. They have no knowledge about whether it is true or 
not. They don’t have the learning about this. So from ignorance these people say 
these topsy-turvy things. Look, no maulwī or muftī, no-one who knows about 
Islam, could have told them such things. People place their trust in rumours 
[sunī-sunāī]. Then they wander about and send these rumours wandering even 
further. 
Clerics in Deoband and Bijnor do not speak with a single voice about contraception, any 
more than villagers do. Yet the clerics’ understanding that people sometimes face 
majbūrī, and that Allah is merciful to those who have repented present a contrast with 
the uncompromisingly harsh views of many villagers about the sterilised person’s fate. 
This mismatch undermines assumptions that the rural masses are slavish followers of 
their religious leaders. Indeed, calm domestic order and cleanliness are not readily 
compatible with everyday rural life (cf. Jeffery et al. 2004). Despite Tablighī tours in 
rural Bijnor, much of the reform agenda has not taken an effective hold there. Rural 
children usually attend madrasahs for only a few years (at most): madrasah staff often 
lament that the fragile impression they make on their pupils’ self-discipline in 
cleanliness, speech, routine and punctuality is liable to reversal once pupils return to the 
village atmosphere (Jeffery et al. 2005, 2006).  Thus, we should question how central the 
reform agenda is in the mundane lives of rural Muslims in Bijnor. 
Situating fertility 
Greenhalgh emphasises the importance of showing how fertility ‘makes sense given the 
socio-cultural and political economic context in which it is embedded’ and of seeing 
fertility transitions as ‘products of changes in class-specific opportunity structures in 
response to transformations of global and regional political economies’ (Greenhalgh 
1995: 17, 21).  Similarly, for Obermeyer ‘the political context is a key factor for 
understanding the way in which [Islamic] religious doctrine is interpreted’ (Obermeyer 
1994: 59). 
These insights are germane here. Muslim villagers’ contraceptive practice is certainly 
coloured by what they believe to be ‘Islamic doctrine’. But, as we have shown, ‘Islamic 
doctrine’ on contraception is not monolithic. Consequently, privileging apparently 
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theological issues will lead us astray. Rather, a more compelling account is yielded by 
focusing on rural Muslims’ ‘secular’ concerns: economic and social marginalisation, the 
Indian government’s family planning programme and communal politics, and the 
political economy of hopelessness (cf. Jeffery & Jeffery 2006). 
Social and economic marginalisation
Despite their numerical strength in Bijnor district, Muslims do not dominate the local 
economy or politics. Crucially, moreover, Muslims in rural Bijnor also perceive 
themselves as economically and socially marginalised (Jeffery et al. 2007; Jeffrey et al. 
2004).  Jamila, for instance, explained the lack of Muslim doctors this way:
You see, Muslims are poor and no one gives them any help. But the government 
helps Hindus. Even if Muslims educate their children, they still won’t get 
‘service’. A Hindu will get ‘service’ and will have earnings, so he’ll give his 
children food on time, he’ll cook good food to eat and he’ll educate them in a good 
school and pay out money for the books. Since the ‘service’ is good, they’ll make 
expenditures. And when children receive education, then they may become 
doctors. But Muslim children don’t get their food on time and the government 
doesn’t help Muslims. So tell me, how can Muslim children become doctors? … 
Whoever has money is making their children into doctors, whether the children 
have the capability [qābilīyat] inside them or not.
Similarly, Latifan commented that Muslims do not benefit from education because they 
do not obtain ‘service’ afterwards. Her neighbour added that this is why Muslim boys do 
not study, and ‘you spend so much money on education and even the money that you 
have saved will also be spent—and still you will not get ‘service’. Rather than that, you 
should spend the money that you have saved on starting some business.’ A widespread 
view is that without social contacts to exert influence [‘source’ or sifārish] or money to 
bribe the personnel making appointments [‘force’], employment will not materialise—
even for someone with educational credentials.  Jabruddin asserted:
No one values Muslims.  Hindus obtain employment in a single breath, but not 
Muslims. … That’s why Muslims aren’t educating their children. They know that 
they won’t get employment—and there is this damage, that a boy won’t be willing 
to do farm work. He won’t want to pick up the sickle. So the unfortunate Muslim 
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is worried just about this: he’s poor. Should he feed his children or spend money 
on educating them?
By contrast, madrasah teachers generally saw inherent value in education, yet they too 
perceived discrimination against even well-educated Muslims and the need to bribe 
officials when seeking employment. Whilst some madrasah teachers felt called to 
perform work that brings religious merit, others had turned to madrasah teaching 
because of financial distress and frustrated ambitions—and because madrasah 
employment can be obtained without bribes. One Begawala madrasah teacher said he 
had been unable to study further because of financial worries: 
I had already tried to get other ‘service’, but to no benefit. So then I took the 
‘service’ here [in the madrasah]. … Enough!  There were worries in the house—
our situation [hālāt] was not good. I had to give daily bread to my wife and 
children. I had to show them consideration. 
One of his colleagues turned to madrasah teaching because his older brother failed to 
fulfil their father’s ambition to have a son highly educated in religious matters. Only after 
we pressed him did he comment: 
Listen! With respect to worldly matters, I’m not happy. … I don’t have money 
because in this ‘line’ there isn’t much money. Now I have just one job: to please 
Allah. If there’s nothing for me here, then I pray to Allah that I will receive my 
reward up there. Look, as far as worldly matters are concerned, I’m certainly not 
happy. … Today, if I were doing something else—for example ‘service’—then I’d 
have more money. When I consider my financial position, I’m not happy. 
Population, the Indian state and communal politics
During the political Emergency (1975-7), the government’s population programme took a 
markedly coercive turn after health workers and other government employees were 
disciplined if they failed to meet family planning ‘targets’, particularly sterilisation. 
There was unparalleled public debate—and widespread distrust of government health 
workers.  Nearly 30 years later, the Deoband Muftī commented: 
Sanjay [Gandhi] captured people and did nasbandī on them. People were on 
journeys by bus and they were dragged out and sterilised. There was great 
tyranny [zulm] then. 
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Throughout our Bijnor research, Muslims have believed they were the particular targets 
of family planning workers and they especially resented the pressure to adopt a 
technique they believe is contrary to Islam. For Muslims, high caste Hindu domination 
of health care provision, government and private alike, undermines the state’s legitimacy 
and some even suggested there was a government initiative to eradicate Muslims. 
Furthermore, the hate-speech of Hindutva ideologues has a long and infamous 
genealogy: building on the ‘common wisdom’ about Muslims’ untrustworthiness and 
lack of patriotism, family planning issues have been increasingly politicised along 
communal lines (Basu 1996, 1997; Jeffery & Jeffery 2006). In September 2003, the 
release of (uncorrected) statistics from the 2001 census created a furore over Muslim 
fertility, which the corrected statistics released later did little to quieten (Bhat & Zavier 
2005; Jeffery & Jeffery 2006; Jeffery & Jeffery 2000, 2005; Rajan 2005). 
Moreover, Muslims’ sense of economic insecurity is compounded by the rise of Hindutva 
politics during the 1990s. In 1990, there were serious disturbances in Bijnor town related 
to the Babri mosque dispute (Basu 1995; Jeffery & Jeffery 1994), whilst the anti-Muslim 
pogroms in Gujarat in 2002 (Varadarajan 2002) generated fearful commentaries from 
villagers and madrasah staff alike. In March 2002, Patricia asked a Begawala maulwī 
about the on-going communal violence in Gujarat. After commenting on rumours that 
madrasahs are weapons arsenals and that Muslims are traitors, he continued: 
You have come here several times. You come without warning. Have you ever 
seen any work of this sort going on? Where are we giving training in shooting 
guns? Here there is not the money for food to eat, so where shall we get bullets? 
Those people who say that there are arms in madrasahs, that there are ISI agents 
[Pakistani spies]—they should go just once and catch them and bring them 
forward. To this day, not a single recovery of arms has been made in any mosque 
or madrasah. No one has been caught. Our reputation is being destroyed. But we 
remain silent. These are false accusations. People talk. Let them talk. We cannot 
reply. We are weak. We remain quiet and silent. … These people are getting us 
killed. Straight off, they are getting us ‘fried’ by bullets. The PAC [Provincial 
Armed Constabulary] are pursuing Muslims tenaciously. … They want to finish 
Muslims off. But they can’t finish us off by firing 100-50 bullets. 
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Political economy of hopelessness
The Indian state’s complicity with Hindutva-inspired anti-Muslim violence—active 
participation by some officials, incitement by others—has seriously compromised rural 
Muslims’ willingness to rely on state protection. Communal biases in health care 
provision (especially family planning) and problems accessing secure employment 
amplify their mistrust. It is, then, unremarkable that Muslim parents in rural Bijnor 
sense their powerlessness to plan their futures—a condition that is captured by the 
notion of a political economy of hopelessness, in which people at the bottom of extremely 
inequitable social systems realistically believe that they cannot exert much control over 
their lives (Appadurai 2004; Jeffery & Jeffery 2006: 128ff.; Popkin 1980; Scott 1985). 
Implicit here, however, is a presumption that social and economic changes could provide 
Muslim parents with incentives to invest in the education of a small number of children. 
It is instructive here to consider countries where Muslim clerics have been involved—in 
various ways and to different extents—in government-sponsored population 
programmes. 
Sometimes we commented on how family planning is actively promoted in Bangladesh. 
Jamila was adamant: 
Such people can’t be Muslims. … Just calling yourself a Muslim doesn’t make you 
a Muslim. We’re certainly uneducated. We don’t know which child was born on 
which date.  But we do know what is in our Islam and what is forbidden.
Similarly, the Deoband Muftī said Bangladesh had been incorrect to normalise 
sterilisation: 
Islam is the same everywhere. It cannot be changed. … If someone gives me Rs10 
lakhs and I sell myself—that is a sinful matter. If because of greed for money, I 
give a false fatwa, then the punishment [‘azāb] will be upon me. 
By contrast, however, one of his colleagues commented (out of his hearing): 
People must change with the times. For example, it used not to be allowed to use 
a microphone for the azān. On many matters, Egypt is ahead and allows different 
things. People should have the children they can rear, but [in the past] they did 
not.
Muslim fertility rates in different countries vary widely, however, and there are no 
consistent differentials between Muslims and their non-Muslim neighbours. 
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Consequently, Jones and Karim argue, presumptions about monolithic religious 
ideologies, or about ‘Islamic contraceptive practice’, divert attention from the diverse 
contexts to which Muslim clerics and others are responding (Jones & Karim 2005). In 
Bangladesh, Muslim clerics have not opposed family planning and sterilisation to the 
same extent as in India. Indeed, their stances shifted very rapidly when social and 
economic conditions changed (Amin & Basu 2000; Amin et al. 1996; Caldwell et al. 
1999). By the late 1980s, Bangladeshi Muslims generally believed that family planning, 
including sterilisation, was not contrary to Islam (Bernhart & Uddin 1990), whilst 
clerical support for the state’s family planning programme was crucial in the 
unprecedented and dramatic decline (by 44 per cent) in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
between 1980-5 and 1995-2000 (Khuda 2005). In Pakistan, by contrast, erratic 
government policy on family planning, the political influence of Maudūdī and the failure 
to co-opt Muslim clerics, accompany much smaller declines in TFR than in Bangladesh 
(Hakim 2005). Popular perceptions of religious leaders’ views on contraception are that 
they are hostile (Ali & Ushijima 2005). In other Muslim-majority countries, notable 
changes in fertility have occurred, sometimes with clerical endorsement of 
contraception, sometimes without their playing a central role (see, for example, papers 
in Jones & Karim 2005).
Of course, these are places where Muslims hold the reins of government. By contrast, 
Muslims in rural Bijnor highlight the role of Hindutva interests and the Indian state in 
their physical vulnerability and social and economic marginalisation. Since the early 
1990s, moreover, Muslims in rural UP have been affected by changes wrought by 
economic liberalisation: squeezed household budgets, rising consumerism reflected in 
dowry demands, the burgeoning market for private education and health care provision 
and moribund state provision. Further, high fertility and declining mortality since the 
1960s have led to land fragmentation: those whose land once provisioned their families 
now describe themselves as ‘neither farmer nor labourer’ [nā kissān, nā mazdūr] or as 
people just ‘managing to survive’ [guzar-basar karnewale], whilst the landless or land-
poor can no longer rely on agricultural labouring. Young men increasingly seek 
employment in Bijnor town, Delhi, Punjab, Kashmir or Surat, generally in sectors where 
Muslims are already well placed (e.g. machine embroidery, tailoring, house construction 
and painting, barbering, vehicle maintenance and rickshaw pulling). Some—especially 
craft work— have been particularly badly hit by economic liberalisation (Ali & Sikand 
2006) and may not provide long-term employment for rural migrants. Young women are 
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still usually married and experiencing childbearing in their mid-teens. There are signs 
that young men are being married at later ages, however, and some continue working 
outside Jhakri (probably with unintended consequences for fertility). Whether these 
developments might trigger intentional fertility limitation is an open question, though. 
Hopelessness may persist, whether because of continuing economic marginalisation or 
communal unrest—and urban employment might increase young men’s contact with 
clerical hostility to contraception. And, if hopelessness about life in this world 
predisposes people to avoid behaviour they believe is sinful to guarantee a good life in 
Paradise, declines in fertility may be slow and halting. Yet privileging supposedly 
doctrinal views on contraception both obscures the diversity of Muslim opinion and side-
steps how ordinary Muslims handle the exigencies of daily life in a liberalising and 
globalising economy. Further, despite interventions by prominent Muslim clerics and 
Hindutva ideologues, Muslim fertility in UP, and India overall, has declined markedly 
since the early 1990s. Tellingly, TFRs for Muslims in south India are often lower even 
than for Hindus, leave aside Muslims, in UP (Jeffery & Jeffery 2006: 33-35). The 
depressed social and economic conditions of UP Muslims are undoubtedly significant in 
this regional contrast. The Sachar report (2006) advocated numerous policy 
interventions to ameliorate Muslims’ position and the UP and central governments alike 
have pledged to implement the report’s proposals. If Muslims’ situations improve, if 
hopefulness were to become imaginable, Muslim fertility levels in UP would almost 
certainly decline—not least because clerical hostility to contraception is not buttressed by 
effective surveillance within the household. As people say, miyān bīwī rāzī, kyā karegā 
qāzī (husband and wife agree, so what will the qāzī do)? 
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